Orlando’s Kyle O’Quinn was trying to save the ball going out of bounds and while this was unintentional it was pretty brutal. Fortunately Andray Blatche wasn’t actually hurt.
The Warriors cruised into the NBA Finals in historic fashion, going 12-0 in the first three rounds and outscoring opponents by 16.3 points per game. The Cavaliers (12-1, +13.6) weren’t too far behind.
But, at 24-1, they don’t have the best combined playoff win percentage by NBA Finalists.
In 1957, the Celtics (3-0) and St. Louis Hawks (5-0) were undefeated entering a series Boston won in seven.
The Hawks, Minneapolis Lakers and Fort Wayne Pistons all went 34-48 in the regular season to tie for the Eastern Division crown. St. Louis won a tiebreaker against each team and advanced to the Western Division finals, beating Minneapolis, 3-0.
Meanwhile, the Celtics won the Eastern Division outright and received a bye to the divisions finals. They swept the Syracuse Nationals to reach the NBA Finals.
Obviously, three rounds present a much bigger hill to climb than a single series (even with a couple tiebreaker games). Golden State and Cleveland are unmatched in modern times.
Here’s every NBA Finals sorted by combined playoff record entering Finals:
Combined point difference per playoff game really shows how much Golden State and Cleveland overwhelmed their conference foes.
The Warriors and Cavs have averaged a +15.0 point difference per game in the playoffs (averaging both teams’ point difference per game equally, so as not to weigh the lesser team more). In the next-best Finals, 1986, neither the Celtics (+12.4) nor Rockets (+8.1) hit that mark alone – let alone averaged.
Here’s every NBA Finals, sorted by the teams’ average point difference per game in previous playoff games:
|2017: GSW-CLE||GSW (+16.3), CLE (+13.6)||+15.0|
|1986: BOS 4, HOU 2||BOS (+12.4), HOU (+8.1)||+10.3|
|1971: MIL 4, BAL 0||MIL (+15.4), BAL (+4.6)||+10.0|
|1950: MNL 4, SYR 2||MNL (+12.1), SYR (+7.6)||+9.9|
|1974: BOS 4, MIL 3||BOS (+6.2), MIL (+13.6)||+9.9|
|2013: MIA 4, SAS 3||MIA (+9.6), SAS (+10.1)||+9.9|
|2016: CLE 4, GSW 3||CLE (+12.6), GSW (+6.4)||+9.5|
|1957: BOS 4, STL 3||BOS (+12.0), STL (+6.8)||+9.4|
|1985: LAL 4, BOS 2||LAL (+13.6), BOS (+4.8)||+9.2|
|1958: STL 4, BOS 2||STL (+10.8), BOS (+7.0)||+8.9|
|1967: PHI 4, SFW 2||PHI (+11.1), SFW (+6.4)||+8.8|
|1996: CHI 4, SEA 2||CHI (+13.9), SEA (+3.5)||+8.7|
|1991: CHI 4, LAL 1||CHI (+12.5), LAL (+4.9)||+8.7|
|2001: LAL 4, PHI 1||LAL (+15.5), PHI (+1.8)||+8.6|
|1989: DET 4, LAL 0||DET (+8.0), LAL (+8.9)||+8.5|
|2015: GSW 4, CLE 2||GSW (+8.1), CLE (+8.8)||+8.4|
|1954: MNL 4, SYR 3||MNL (+8.8), SYR (+7.8)||+8.3|
|1949: MNL 4, WSC 2||MNL (+9.0), WSC (+7.2)||+8.1|
|1984: BOS 4, LAL 3||BOS (+7.0), LAL (+9.1)||+8.1|
|1948: BLB 4, PHW 2||BLB (+4.5), PHW (+11.0)||+7.8|
|2014: SAS 4, MIA 1||SAS (+8.0), MIA (+7.0)||+7.5|
|1987: LAL 4, BOS 2||LAL (+15.0), BOS (0.0)||+7.5|
|2012: MIA 4, OKC 1||MIA (+7.9), OKC (+6.7)||+7.3|
|1956: PHW 4, FTW 1||PHW (+8.4), FTW (+5.2)||+6.8|
|1992: CHI 4, POR 2||CHI (+5.8), POR (+7.6)||+6.7|
|1953: MNL 4, NYK 1||MNL (+6.4), NYK (+6.8)||+6.6|
|1964: BOS 4, SFW 1||BOS (+8.4), SFW (+4.9)||+6.6|
|1973: NYK 4, LAL 1||NYK (+5.6), LAL (+7.6)||+6.6|
|1998: CHI 4, UTA 2||CHI (+6.7), UTA (+6.4)||+6.5|
|2005: SAS 4, DET 3||SAS (+7.1), DET (+5.8)||+6.4|
|1997: CHI 4, UTA 2||CHI (+7.8), UTA (+5.0)||+6.4|
|2003: SAS 4, NJN 2||SAS (+5.4), NJN (+7.3)||+6.3|
|1969: BOS 4, LAL 3||BOS (+5.4), LAL (+7.3)||+6.3|
|1962: BOS 4, LAL 3||BOS (+5.6), LAL (+7.0)||+6.3|
|1999: SAS 4, NYK 1||SAS (+8.2), NYK (+4.3)||+6.3|
|1982: LAL 4, PHI 2||LAL (+10.8), PHI (+1.7)||+6.2|
|1968: BOS 4, LAL 2||BOS (+3.8), LAL (+8.6)||+6.2|
|1970: NYK 4, LAL 3||NYK (+5.3), LAL (+7.0)||+6.1|
|1955: SYR 4, FTW 3||SYR (+7.3), FTW (+4.8)||+6.0|
|2011: DAL 4, MIA 2||DAL (+7.1), MIA (+4.7)||+5.9|
|1972: LAL 4, NYK 1||LAL (+2.6), NYK (+8.8)||+5.7|
|2009: LAL 4, ORL 1||LAL (+6.6), ORL (+4.8)||+5.7|
|1966: BOS 4, LAL 3||BOS (+7.1), LAL (+4.3)||+5.7|
|1947: PHW 4, CHS 1||PHW (+6.0), CHS (+5.0)||+5.5|
|1951: ROC 4, NYK 3||ROC (+8.9), NYK (+2.0)||+5.4|
|1961: BOS 4, STL 1||BOS (+10.8), STL (0.0)||+5.4|
|2008: BOS 4, LAL 2||BOS (+4.3), LAL (+6.4)||+5.4|
|2006: MIA 4, DAL 2||MIA (+4.8), DAL (+5.9)||+5.3|
|1975: GSW 4, WSB 0||GSW (+5.7), WSB (+4.7)||+5.2|
|1988: LAL 4, DET 3||LAL (+4.6), DET (+5.4)||+5.0|
|1980: LAL 4, PHI 2||LAL (+3.7), PHI (+6.0)||+4.9|
|1993: CHI 4, PHO 2||CHI (+8.5), PHO (+1.1)||+4.8|
|2004: DET 4, LAL 1||DET (+5.7), LAL (+3.8)||+4.7|
|2010: LAL 4, BOS 3||LAL (+4.0), BOS (+5.3)||+4.6|
|1983: PHI 4, LAL 0||PHI (+4.9), LAL (+4.4)||+4.6|
|1963: BOS 4, LAL 2||BOS (+5.6), LAL (+3.0)||+4.3|
|1960: BOS 4, STL 3||BOS (+3.3), STL (+4.7)||+4.0|
|2007: SAS 4, CLE 0||SAS (+3.4), CLE (+4.2)||+3.8|
|1981: BOS 4, HOU 2||BOS (+4.0), HOU (+3.3)||+3.7|
|1977: POR 4, PHI 2||POR (+3.9), PHI (+3.2)||+3.6|
|2000: LAL 4, IND 2||LAL (+3.8), IND (+2.9)||+3.4|
|1990: DET 4, POR 1||DET (+7.7), POR (-1.4)||+3.1|
|1994: HOU 4, NYK 3||HOU (+4.8), NYK (+1.2)||+3.0|
|1978: WSB 4, SEA 3||WSB (+2.4), SEA (+3.5)||+2.9|
|1995: HOU 4, ORL 0||HOU (+1.8), ORL (+3.2)||+2.5|
|2002: LAL 4, NJN 0||LAL (+2.3), NJN (+2.3)||+2.3|
|1965: BOS 4, LAL 1||BOS (+2.9), LAL (+1.7)||+2.3|
|1952: MNL 4, NYK 3||MNL (+3.7), NYK (0.0)||+1.8|
|1959: BOS 4, MNL 0||BOS (+6.3), MNL (-3.0)||+1.6|
|1976: BOS 4, PHO 2||BOS (+2.3), PHO (+0.5)||+1.4|
|1979: SEA 4, WSB 1||SEA (+1.6), WSB (-0.1)||+0.8|
He’s 6-foot-8. He’s super-athletic. He’s competitive as hell. He’s skilled enough to play the point in a pinch and tough enough that he played the four at Kansas. On paper, he’s Andrew Wiggins physically with all the intangibles that we wish Wiggins had.
Then there’s the other side of it.
Jackson’s jump shot, which went in at a 37.8 percent clip from beyond the arc last season, has enough of a hitch in it that there is legitimate concern about just how good of a shooter he’ll end up being without a complete overhaul of his stroke. There’s also the mental side of the game: Jackson’s an instinctual playmaker that has a bad habit of being a space cadet defensively.
I’m not here to tell you those red flags don’t exist. They do. He has room to grow there.
But I am here to tell you that Josh Jackson is closer to being the best prospect in this draft than the third-best, and by the time I’m done here, you’ll be agreeing with me.
2016-17 Stats: 16.3 points, 7.4 boards, 3.0 assists, 1.7 steals, 1.1 blocks, 37.8% 3PT
STRENGTHS: The reason that Jackson is so coveted as a prospect are the things that he does that you cannot teach.
It starts with his competitiveness. Jackson is a fiery, he’s intense and it manifests itself in the way that he plays, almost to a fault; Jackson picked up four fouls in 11 of 35 games as a freshman and picked up a handful of technical fouls after interactions with officials. There’s also a toughness to him that outweighs his 207 pound frame. He’s not afraid to get into tangles for loose balls, he’s not going to get backed down easily and he’s more than willing to put his body on the line to take a charge. Simply put: I’d rather try to keep the reins on a player that may care just a little too much than have to find a way to fire up an apathetic talent.
Then there are the physical tools. Athletically, he’s a bouncy, quick-twitch player that can move laterally with terrific body control and the ability to changes speeds on the move. He’s quick enough to stay in front of point guards and explosive enough to block shots, catch lobs and throw down tip-dunks, and his 6-foot-8 size allows him to be a versatile, multi-positional defender. I hesitate on saying he has a elite physical tools due to his wingspan and frame, but we’ll get to that in a minute.
Lastly, there are his instincts. He’s a read-and-react player, a guy that can make plays defensively by jumping passing lanes, getting weak-side blocks and taking charges. He has a knack for getting easy buckets cutting to the rim and is aggressive on the glass on both ends of the floor.
Those are things that cannot be taught. You either have it in you or you don’t, and Jackson has it.
He also has some skills. We’ll get into the issues with his jump shot in a minute, but Jackson did make 37.8 percent of his threes as a freshman, including a 25-for-52 stretch to close the season. He utilizes ball-fakes and has a good enough first step to attack close outs, and while he isn’t the best or most creative finisher at the rim, he is capable of using both hands and has shown that he can make a floater.
What’s more promising, however, is that Jackson has the potential to be a secondary ball-handler and creator. He has above-average vision and is an unselfish player and willing passer, averaging 3.0 assists as a freshman. He can operate in pick-and-rolls and is capable of bringing the ball up against pressure.
He’s still raw offensively — he makes some bad decisions, commits some turnovers — and, at times, looks like he hasn’t been coached all that much defensively, but the skills he does have combined with the things he does that cannot be taught are a fantastic foundation for an NBA organization to work with.
In a sport that is becoming increasingly positionless, Jackson provides starpower potential with versatility on both ends of the floor.
WEAKNESSES: The biggest issue with Jackson as a prospect is his jump shot. Yes, he shot 37.8 percent from beyond the arc, but it’s hard to tell whether or not that’s just the result of Jackson getting hot in a small sample of catch-and-shoot jumpers.
According to Synergy, Jackson shot just 57 percent from the free throw line, 35.9 percent on all jump shots, 32.3 percent on jumpers off the dribble and just 20.8 percent on two-point jumpers. The main concern is that Jackson has a hitch in his release that creates a lot of moving parts in his stroke, resulting in different release points. You can see it in the video below, there is a slingshot action in his release:
The question marks surrounding Jackson’s jumper sink his stock because, despite his height, he doesn’t project as a guy that can play the small-ball four role in the NBA the way that he did at Kansas. Jackson’s 6-foot-10 wingspan is relatively short — for comparison’s sake, Draymond Green has a 7-foot-2 wingspan and Kawhi Leonard has a 7-foot-3 wingspan — and his slender frame makes it hard to project just how much more muscle mass his body can hold.
Put another way, Jackson can guard twos and threes — and potentially ones — at the next level, but he’s not guarding fours. He’s going to be playing a position where he either needs to be an knockdown shooter or capable of creating in isolation in the half court, and Jackson scored just 0.609 points per possession in isolation as a freshman, the 23rd percentile, despite being guarded predominantly by college four-men on a team with three three-point snipers around him.
It begs the question: Is he ever going to be great at anything on the offensive end of the floor?
And that’s before you factor in that he turned 20 years old in February; he’s older than one-and-done freshmen drafted in 2016.
The other issue you’ll hear mentioned with Jackson is that he has bad habits defensively and he gets beaten on the dribble more easily than you would expect from someone with his athleticism. The bad habits — specifically, the tendency to lose focus on who he is guarding — seems to me to be a result of Jackson trying a little too hard to be a playmaker off the ball, and getting beaten off the dribble has a lot to do with his overactive, choppy feet.
Neither are all that concerning to me, particularly when you factor in his intangibles on that end of the floor. Those issues can be coached away, and there’s not better place for that to happen than in the NBA.
NBA COMPARISON: The easy — and lazy — comparison to make is Andrew Wiggins, who is another 6-foot-8, freakishly-athletic small forward to come out of Kansas, and it’s not the worst comparison I’ve ever seen. The two have similar physical tools and question marks about their jump shots. The problem with that comparison, however, is that the things that make Jackson so intriguing are precisely the skills that Wiggins struggles with.
Jackson is a tough, versatile defender and a fiery competitor that is well-rounded offensively: unselfish with promising court vision and a knack for making instinctual, read-and-react plays. His ceiling is as a player that can average more than 20 points, act as a secondary ball-handler and play maker while potentially being a shutdown defender for twos and threes. Andre Igoudala, before he landed with Golden State and turned into a role player in the twilight of his career, had a seven-year stretch where he averaged 12 points, five boards, five assists and 1.5 steals, scoring more than 17 points per game in four of those seasons.
OUTLOOK: The way I see it, Josh Jackson is the the second-best prospect in this draft. I’d draft him over Lonzo Ball, and I think the gap between Markelle Fultz and Josh Jackson is smaller than the gap between Josh Jackson and Ball, who would be third on my draft board.
Jackson has some issues that need fixing — his jump shot, his tendency to be a space cadet defensively — and there are some valid concerns about his age and the fact that his slender frame may not be able to hold all that much more weight, but those issues are coachable. What isn’t coachable, however, is his competitiveness, his intensity, his unselfishness, his instincts and his ability to read the game and be a playmaker, both offensively and defensively.
He’s a gifted athlete that is going to fight — quite possibly in the literal sense — for the team that he’s on. If he puts in the time to develop his jumper, his body and his focus on the defensive side of the ball, I don’t think it’s out of the question that he could average 25 points, five boards and five assists as a shutdown wing defender.
Seven All-Stars appearing in the Finals the same year is tied for the most ever with 1983 (76ers: Andrew Toney, Moses Malone, Julius Erving, Maurice Cheeks; Lakers: Magic Johnson, Jamaal Wilkes, Kareem Abdul-Jabbar) and 1962 (Celtics: Bill Russell, Bob Cousy, Sam Jones, Tom Heinsohn; Lakers: Elgin Baylor, Frank Selvy, Jerry West).
But there were 24 All-Stars and 23 teams in 1983 and 24 All-Stars and nine teams in 1962. This year, there were 25 All-Stars and 30 teams – a ratio that makes this year’s feat more impressive.
To account for these differences, I’ve used All-Stars above average – the number of All-Stars in the Finals relative to the number of All-Stars for two average teams that year. For example, the average team had 0.83 All-Stars this year. So, an average matchup of two teams would feature 1.67 All-Stars. The 2017 Finals have seven All-Stars – a difference of 5.33.
Here are the All-Stars above average for every Finals since the NBA instituted an All-Star game:
Here are breakdowns of the Finals with the most All-Stars above average:
All-Stars per team: 0.83
All-Stars above average: 5.33
1983 76ers 4, Lakers 0
All-Stars per team: 1.04
All-Stars above average: 4.91
1987 Lakers 4, Celtics 2
All-Stars per team: 1.09
All-Stars above average: 3.83
2013 Heat 4, Spurs 3
All-Stars per team: 0.83
All-Stars above average: 3.33
2012 Heat 4, Thunder 1
All-Stars per team: 0.83
All-Stars above average: 3.33
2009 Lakers 4, Magic 1
All-Stars per team: 0.87
All-Stars above average: 3.27
2010 Lakers 4, Celtics 3
All-Stars per team: 0.93
All-Stars above average: 3.13
If you’re wondering about the below-average outliers:
Washington Bullets forward Elvin Hayes was the only All-Star in the Bullets’ 4-3 win over the Seattle SuperSonics in 1978, when there were 23 All-Stars and 22 teams.
There were four All-Stars in the 1965 Finals: Sam Jones, Bill Russell and Tom Heinsohn for the victorious Celtics and Jerry West for the Lakers, who lost in five. Yet, that was still below average in a league with nine teams and 21 All-Stars.
That’s why it’s important to consider the NBA’s changing landscape – which leads to even more appreciation for the caliber of players in this year’s Finals.
Of course, current All-Star status is not the only measure of stardom. The NBA’s best player should count more than the league’s 12th-best player in the lesser conference.
But these Finals would hold up by any measure. They feature winners of the last five MVPs (Curry, Durant, LeBron) and the consensus best player in the world (LeBron).
Cavaliers-Warriors III will truly feature a special collection of talent.
Is Paul bolting L.A. for the Spurs realistic?
Adrian Wojnarowski of Yahoo Sports on CBS Sports Radio:
Not that I see. I don’t know where that came from, and I’ve spent a lot of time around the Spurs this spring. They would have to just tear up that entire payroll. It’s almost unlike anything the Spurs would have done or would do to. To even have a chance at him, they’d have to really gut the roster. And to do that for a 30-plus-year-old point guard, who has a couple great years left, there’s no question – I think there’s more pressure on the Clippers to have to re-sign him than for the Spurs to turn their whole franchise over to make a run at him. Listen, Chris Paul, financially, the difference with him being able to stay in L.A. and get paid, I’d still have a hard time imaging him leaving there. There’s so much money for him to be made. And in that Los Angeles market, in terms of his marketing endorsements, I still think they’re a pretty overwhelming favorite to re-sign him.
The Clippers can offer Paul a projected $205 million over five years. Because they have his Bird Rights, they don’t need cap space to re-sign him.
The Spurs’ max offer to Paul projects to be $152 million over four years, but they’d need major moves to clear enough cap room to do that. Even if they trim their roster to Kawhi Leonard, LaMarcus Aldridge, Danny Green, Pau Gasol and Tony Parker, they’d still need to dump two of those players.
It’s obviously a lot for San Antonio to overcome.
But it’s not so far outside the Spurs’ norm. To sign LaMarcus Aldridge two years ago, they traded Tiago Splitter (to Hawks) and let Cory Joseph (Raptors), Aron Baynes (Pistons), Marco Belinelli (Kings) walk in free agency.
Paul is probably more valuable than the players San Antonio would have to shed this time around, though his age and the Spurs’ loyalty to Parker raise questions. Would they rather dump an injured and declining Parker or a productive player like Green or Aldridge? (Gasol, who has spent only one year in San Antonio and might even be convinced to opt out, is the most likely to go.)
The Clippers should be favored to sign Paul. But I wouldn’t completely rule out the Spurs.