In depth: Stern fires shot across the bow at the Maloofs, who continue to threaten the NBA’s billion dollar arena subsidy

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A meticulous planner, everything David Stern says is run through a filter of lawyerly instinct and an ever-present awareness of his surroundings.

So when David Aldridge asked him if the NBA would support the Maloofs in their desire to move the Sacramento Kings to Anaheim on Tuesday – don’t think for a second that he hadn’t weighed the legal gravity of the situation or the wishes of his 29 other bosses.

“If there was a vote now, there would be no support for a move,” Stern said.

Stern then went on to poke at the Maloofs for their current plan, which includes staying in the nearly dilapidated Power Balance Pavilion for at least one more season, despite the family threatening to leave town for years because the building is dilapidated.

“That’s their prerogative. As long as it (Power Balance) stands and passes the fire code, I think it’s been a terrific place for the fans of Sacramento,” said Stern in his typical dry wit.

This is the most recent play on the NBA’s relocation chess board, and with the Maloofs overtly implying an antitrust lawsuit against the league for well over a year now, it’s a telling one.

Antitrust suits have been the weapon of choice for owners looking to find greener pastures, and though case law provides limited guidance for courts, it has generally been a favorable area of law for relocation efforts.

On the other side of the coin lies the ‘best interest of the league’ clause found in most sports associations’ bylaws, including the NBA’s. The bylaws allow for the commissioner to take any action they deem necessary to protect the league, and the league’s preferred association status is tied to the commissioner’s ability to show that ‘due process’ has been provided during disputes amongst owners.

The best way to understand this is to know that the courts generally aren’t going to restrain the trade of an NBA owner. They’re also not going to allow an owner unilateral ability to destroy the league that it operates within as a single entity, and the tipping point is somewhere in the middle. The leagues and courts have already found mechanisms (relocation fees) that allow the individual entities impacted by a move to be indemnified to a certain degree.

In the case of the Maloofs’ attempted move to Anaheim, sources with knowledge of the situation have reported that a relocation fee would be upwards of $300 million.

In this case, there are two injured parties in L.A. that would disapprove of the Maloofs’ desire to move into their market, but the more pressing issue for all of the NBA’s owners is what the Maloofs are doing to impact the integrity of the league’s billion dollar arena subsidy.

Since 1990, the NBA and its players have enjoyed a $3 billion public subsidy toward arena costs.

In April, the family backed out of a deal that as anchor tenants required them to pay $73 million toward a $391 million facility – $67 million of which would be provided by the NBA in the form of a loan. George Maloof called it a “good deal,” Gavin Maloof cried tears of joy after the parties emerged from an Orlando hotel room heralding the deal during All Star Weekend, and both Gavin and brother Joe held Sacramento mayor Kevin Johnson’s hands in triumph at the Kings’ next home game.

All of it was a ruse, though. It became clear that the Maloofs had no intention of striking a long-term deal with Sacramento when political crisis consultant Eric Rose was brought on by the family to handle its media strategy, and their antitrust attorneys began sending threat letters to the city that were designed to disrupt its ability to deliver on a tight timeline. Then came the ridiculous requests and demands, and the confidential communications between the family and the NBA eventually were leaked to a Sacramento website that opposed the arena deal.

Eventually, the Maloofs would burn most of their bridges in Sacramento in what Stern would describe later that day as “not the weirdest press conference we’ve ever had.” They hired an economist that twisted enough facts for Stern to say he acted in “ill grace,” and their antitrust attorneys pitched against Sacramento over PowerPoint. With only the Sacramento media allowed in their New York hotel conference room, George Maloof went on a wild tirade that made their economist Chris Thornberg look like a beacon of truth.

The NBA, who was authorized by the Maloofs to represent them in negotiations, thought the deal was fair, but the Maloofs expected to pay nothing and control all of the revenue streams in Sacramento. They expected this because of Anaheim’s long-standing offer to bring the Kings down south. Billionaire Henry Samueli and Anaheim’s city council’s offer to provide cash relief to the family would theoretically allow them to continue operating the team while making big market TV money, with the fallback position of selling the team for more than they could in Sacramento due to the larger market.

But that didn’t account for the minimum $300 relocation fee that the Maloofs or any subsequent owners would have to pay to infringe upon the Lakers and Clippers’ markets, making the deal untenable for the Maloofs if they wanted to keep the team. If their plan was to sell to Samueli or another Anaheim group, the relocation fee would certainly be a big nut for the new owners to take on in addition to the price of the franchise, not to mention a huge deterrent if the new owner senses they’re not wanted by the league.

It has been theorized that this relocation fee was communicated at some point to the Maloofs, who expected to leverage (or take) Anaheim’s offer despite being near the finish line with Sacramento. In that theory, once the Maloofs realized a move to Anaheim was not in the cards they decided to officially muck up a Sacramento deal that reflected their meager contributions, while testing their leverage with antitrust threats.

Regardless of the Maloofs’ intentions, cities that negotiate with the NBA and team owners over arena subsidies will now point to the family’s apparent bad faith dealings. Now, the league will have to explain to its civic partners how and why they should expend political capital and public funds if owners are going to use the scorched earth strategy when they don’t get what they want.

Sacramento spent significant sums of money and staff time in the arena negotiations process during a budgetary crisis only to find they were spinning their wheels – all while offering to pay for 65 percent of the arena’s costs – and the NBA is going to have to wear that issue unless they make it right by keeping a team there under a workable plan.

The timing couldn’t be worse for the league, either, with the Oklahoma City Thunder in the Finals just four years after Stern, former Sonics owner Howard Schultz, and now Thunder owner Clay Bennett stole 41 years of Sonics history from Seattle because the local government wouldn’t pony up. The government there certainly shoulders some of the blame for how that went down, but as the documentary Sonicsgate so handily points out – the principals on the NBA’s side had agendas that aren’t exactly ringing endorsements for the league.

Even if the league somehow makes things right in Sacramento and Seattle, this pulling back of the curtain could shave millions, if not billions of dollars off the NBA’s bottom line if not handled correctly by the owners. Municipalities are going to have a harder time convincing voters to part with tax money as the subsidy shakedown gets exposed, and arena funding campaigns will be forced to seek lower funding amounts as local voters lose their appetite for unsavory business tactics.

Whether it’s in the best interest of the league’s balance sheet, or the best interest of the league’s PR efforts, the Maloofs are killing the association on both fronts.

With Sonicsgate discussion now creeping into the national discourse during the Finals, we saw the first signs on Tuesday that the owners aren’t going to let the Maloofs throw the baby out with the bathwater. By stating publicly that the Maloofs have “no support” for a move to Anaheim, the league has all-but invited the Maloofs to pursue their antitrust suit.

Namely, a decision to not once, but twice inform the family that they cannot move could spawn any number of antitrust damages. If monies or opportunities are lost as the result of the league’s decision to block relocation last year, or if Stern’s public statement this year causes any damages – it adds a yet another critical piece of evidence the family could use when piled on top of the rest of the evidence they’ve been compiling.

This is a decision that does not come lightly, because neither the league nor its owners truly want to face the time and expense of a massive lawsuit like that, nor do they attack their own knowing they will one day be on the other end of the subsidy discussion themselves. At a higher level, the league does not want to see any more case law put onto record that would either weaken its ability to police itself or the various antitrust protections it enjoys. At the top of that list is the ability for the NBA and other sports associations to leverage its limited, monopolistic demand (teams) against cities in the gathering of public subsidy dollars.

Perhaps the league is aware of a solid offer from Seattle billionaire Chris Hansen that nobody out of Sacramento is willing to match, and that is the source of their confidence in saying the Maloofs would have “no support” in moving to Anaheim. Seattle mayor Mike McGinn met with Stern in New York on Monday and Hansen is ready to take on most of the cost of building an NBA-ready arena, assuming of course he can buy a team. That Stern didn’t mention the city in his response to Aldridge is a huge footnote.

Hansen could conceivably justify a higher purchase price than a Sacramento buyer given his land holdings around the proposed Sodo arena site, and the fact Seattle is about 30 percent larger than Sacramento in terms of its TV market. But those advantages are somewhat mitigated by the fact that a Seattle team would have to compete with both the Seahawks and Mariners for local revenues, whereas the Kings are the only show in town in Sacramento.

That said, saying the league decided to open itself up to antitrust exposure because of a bona fide offer it knows about from Seattle assumes a lot – including Seattle’s ability to deliver on an arena while they face local opposition of their own. It’s way more likely that the league has weighed the Maloofs’ ability to impact the league now and into the future, and it has decided that it’s in their best interests to call the family’s bluff.

If the family still cannot afford to spend money on free agents, and they will be losing significant revenue after spending the last few years biting the hands that feed them in Sacramento – Tuesday’s comments suggest the league has determined that the Maloofs cannot afford to play the antitrust card.

As is the case in most legal disputes, the winner isn’t determined by a judge or jury verdict, but which side has the largest stones and deepest pockets. The Maloofs have a large holding in Wells Fargo which many sources say is untouchable, and outside of that they have a fledgling entertainment business and a partnership to sell (OMG!) cell phone cases.

If we’re buying what the NBA sold us last summer, owning a team isn’t a huge money making endeavor. In reality, it’s a complex issue magnified by being in a small market. And unless you have a way to maximize what a basketball franchise can do, there are plenty of ways to make more from the investment it takes to play in the billionaires’ playpen.

To truly justify owning an NBA basketball team, one has to maximize their various holdings through cross promotion, invest in the areas around the arena, and maximize tax breaks before selling at an appreciated gain one day. To do this it takes a minimum level of free agent spending to field a team that will generate revenues to make that work.

The Maloofs don’t have the money to be that type of owner, at least anymore.

The Maloofs once had designs on maximizing the values of their holdings in the Palms and their entertainment empire, but the entertainment empire never panned out and the Palms is no longer theirs. Sacramento gave the family some proximity to help with the promotion of both entities, but now that bridges have been burned there, the only other destination that would supplement what is left of their non-NBA holdings was just rejected during Stern’s press conference.

Elsewhere, Seattle billionaire Chris Hansen isn’t going to build an arena so ‘the boys’ can play around in it, and even if the other cities that have expressed interest in the NBA can offer a sweetheart deal to them, they can’t significantly change the Maloofs’ cash-strapped outlook.

The only plan that makes any financial sense is for them to sell the team to the highest bidder, and with billionaire Robert Pera reportedly paying approximately $350 million for the Grizzlies to keep the team in Memphis and Tom Benson paying $338 million for the Hornets, it’s possible the Maloofs can top the $400 million mark on their way out the door.

Sacramento’s TV market is double the size of both Memphis and New Orleans, and it’s certainly plausible that Pera made an offer to the Maloofs given his Northern California roots. That Pera wasn’t able to buy the team from the Maloofs (or didn’t try) could speak to any number of issues, but finding a price point that would entice the Maloofs to sell is the NBA’s best bet at ridding themselves of their billion dollar subsidy problem.

A $400 million sale would provide $172 million for the Maloofs’ 43 percent stake, and with at least $150 million owed to the city of Sacramento and the NBA, every dollar is going to count if the family is seeking a debt-free break.

By chopping off the Anaheim leg of the Maloofs’ leverage play, the NBA is one Space Needle market away from stealing away all of the family’s leverage in a potential sale. Franchise prices in Vancouver, Columbus, Louisville, or Kansas City aren’t going to top what multiple Sacramento buyers are willing to pay, and with Seattle closing in on a viable offer it will soon be time for those buyers to put their last, best offers in, as well.

Stern loves the Sacramento market, the 20th largest market in the country and one that is devoid of competition from other sports leagues. He goes out of his way to praise the city at every opportunity for the job they did getting an arena deal done. But he’ll have a hard time forcing the Maloofs to take a substantially smaller offer to stay in California’s capitol.

It’s a nasty game of relocation chess right now. Milwaukee is next up on the clock with a year-to-year lease, an aging arena, and an aging owner. The NBA will be right back at it demanding a public subsidy, assuming of course they don’t let the Maloofs cook the goose that lays the billion dollar eggs.

As for the Maloofs, they have yet to respond to Stern’s ‘call,’ and it remains to be seen if they continue their bluff all the way down the river.

Warriors, Cavaliers reached NBA Finals with unprecedented combined playoff dominance

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The Warriors cruised into the NBA Finals in historic fashion, going 12-0 in the first three rounds and outscoring opponents by 16.3 points per game. The Cavaliers (12-1, +13.6) weren’t too far behind.

But, at 24-1, they don’t have the best combined playoff win percentage by NBA Finalists.

In 1957, the Celtics (3-0) and St. Louis Hawks (5-0) were undefeated entering a series Boston won in seven.

The Hawks, Minneapolis Lakers and Fort Wayne Pistons all went 34-48 in the regular season to tie for the Eastern Division crown. St. Louis won a tiebreaker against each team and advanced to the Western Division finals, beating Minneapolis, 3-0.

Meanwhile, the Celtics won the Eastern Division outright and received a bye to the divisions finals. They swept the Syracuse Nationals to reach the NBA Finals.

Obviously, three rounds present a much bigger hill to climb than a single series (even with a couple tiebreaker games). Golden State and Cleveland are unmatched in modern times.

Here’s every NBA Finals sorted by combined playoff record entering Finals:

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Combined point difference per playoff game really shows how much Golden State and Cleveland overwhelmed their conference foes.

The Warriors and Cavs have averaged a +15.0 point difference per game in the playoffs (averaging both teams’ point difference per game equally, so as not to weigh the lesser team more). In the next-best Finals, 1986, neither the Celtics (+12.4) nor Rockets (+8.1) hit that mark alone – let alone averaged.

Here’s every NBA Finals, sorted by the teams’ average point difference per game in previous playoff games:

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Finals Point differences Combined
2017: GSW-CLE GSW (+16.3), CLE (+13.6) +15.0
1986: BOS 4, HOU 2 BOS (+12.4), HOU (+8.1) +10.3
1971: MIL 4, BAL 0 MIL (+15.4), BAL (+4.6) +10.0
1950: MNL 4, SYR 2 MNL (+12.1), SYR (+7.6) +9.9
1974: BOS 4, MIL 3 BOS (+6.2), MIL (+13.6) +9.9
2013: MIA 4, SAS 3 MIA (+9.6), SAS (+10.1) +9.9
2016: CLE 4, GSW 3 CLE (+12.6), GSW (+6.4) +9.5
1957: BOS 4, STL 3 BOS (+12.0), STL (+6.8) +9.4
1985: LAL 4, BOS 2 LAL (+13.6), BOS (+4.8) +9.2
1958: STL 4, BOS 2 STL (+10.8), BOS (+7.0) +8.9
1967: PHI 4, SFW 2 PHI (+11.1), SFW (+6.4) +8.8
1996: CHI 4, SEA 2 CHI (+13.9), SEA (+3.5) +8.7
1991: CHI 4, LAL 1 CHI (+12.5), LAL (+4.9) +8.7
2001: LAL 4, PHI 1 LAL (+15.5), PHI (+1.8) +8.6
1989: DET 4, LAL 0 DET (+8.0), LAL (+8.9) +8.5
2015: GSW 4, CLE 2 GSW (+8.1), CLE (+8.8) +8.4
1954: MNL 4, SYR 3 MNL (+8.8), SYR (+7.8) +8.3
1949: MNL 4, WSC 2 MNL (+9.0), WSC (+7.2) +8.1
1984: BOS 4, LAL 3 BOS (+7.0), LAL (+9.1) +8.1
1948: BLB 4, PHW 2 BLB (+4.5), PHW (+11.0) +7.8
2014: SAS 4, MIA 1 SAS (+8.0), MIA (+7.0) +7.5
1987: LAL 4, BOS 2 LAL (+15.0), BOS (0.0) +7.5
2012: MIA 4, OKC 1 MIA (+7.9), OKC (+6.7) +7.3
1956: PHW 4, FTW 1 PHW (+8.4), FTW (+5.2) +6.8
1992: CHI 4, POR 2 CHI (+5.8), POR (+7.6) +6.7
1953: MNL 4, NYK 1 MNL (+6.4), NYK (+6.8) +6.6
1964: BOS 4, SFW 1 BOS (+8.4), SFW (+4.9) +6.6
1973: NYK 4, LAL 1 NYK (+5.6), LAL (+7.6) +6.6
1998: CHI 4, UTA 2 CHI (+6.7), UTA (+6.4) +6.5
2005: SAS 4, DET 3 SAS (+7.1), DET (+5.8) +6.4
1997: CHI 4, UTA 2 CHI (+7.8), UTA (+5.0) +6.4
2003: SAS 4, NJN 2 SAS (+5.4), NJN (+7.3) +6.3
1969: BOS 4, LAL 3 BOS (+5.4), LAL (+7.3) +6.3
1962: BOS 4, LAL 3 BOS (+5.6), LAL (+7.0) +6.3
1999: SAS 4, NYK 1 SAS (+8.2), NYK (+4.3) +6.3
1982: LAL 4, PHI 2 LAL (+10.8), PHI (+1.7) +6.2
1968: BOS 4, LAL 2 BOS (+3.8), LAL (+8.6) +6.2
1970: NYK 4, LAL 3 NYK (+5.3), LAL (+7.0) +6.1
1955: SYR 4, FTW 3 SYR (+7.3), FTW (+4.8) +6.0
2011: DAL 4, MIA 2 DAL (+7.1), MIA (+4.7) +5.9
1972: LAL 4, NYK 1 LAL (+2.6), NYK (+8.8) +5.7
2009: LAL 4, ORL 1 LAL (+6.6), ORL (+4.8) +5.7
1966: BOS 4, LAL 3 BOS (+7.1), LAL (+4.3) +5.7
1947: PHW 4, CHS 1 PHW (+6.0), CHS (+5.0) +5.5
1951: ROC 4, NYK 3 ROC (+8.9), NYK (+2.0) +5.4
1961: BOS 4, STL 1 BOS (+10.8), STL (0.0) +5.4
2008: BOS 4, LAL 2 BOS (+4.3), LAL (+6.4) +5.4
2006: MIA 4, DAL 2 MIA (+4.8), DAL (+5.9) +5.3
1975: GSW 4, WSB 0 GSW (+5.7), WSB (+4.7) +5.2
1988: LAL 4, DET 3 LAL (+4.6), DET (+5.4) +5.0
1980: LAL 4, PHI 2 LAL (+3.7), PHI (+6.0) +4.9
1993: CHI 4, PHO 2 CHI (+8.5), PHO (+1.1) +4.8
2004: DET 4, LAL 1 DET (+5.7), LAL (+3.8) +4.7
2010: LAL 4, BOS 3 LAL (+4.0), BOS (+5.3) +4.6
1983: PHI 4, LAL 0 PHI (+4.9), LAL (+4.4) +4.6
1963: BOS 4, LAL 2 BOS (+5.6), LAL (+3.0) +4.3
1960: BOS 4, STL 3 BOS (+3.3), STL (+4.7) +4.0
2007: SAS 4, CLE 0 SAS (+3.4), CLE (+4.2) +3.8
1981: BOS 4, HOU 2 BOS (+4.0), HOU (+3.3) +3.7
1977: POR 4, PHI 2 POR (+3.9), PHI (+3.2) +3.6
2000: LAL 4, IND 2 LAL (+3.8), IND (+2.9) +3.4
1990: DET 4, POR 1 DET (+7.7), POR (-1.4) +3.1
1994: HOU 4, NYK 3 HOU (+4.8), NYK (+1.2) +3.0
1978: WSB 4, SEA 3 WSB (+2.4), SEA (+3.5) +2.9
1995: HOU 4, ORL 0 HOU (+1.8), ORL (+3.2) +2.5
2002: LAL 4, NJN 0 LAL (+2.3), NJN (+2.3) +2.3
1965: BOS 4, LAL 1 BOS (+2.9), LAL (+1.7) +2.3
1952: MNL 4, NYK 3 MNL (+3.7), NYK (0.0) +1.8
1959: BOS 4, MNL 0 BOS (+6.3), MNL (-3.0) +1.6
1976: BOS 4, PHO 2 BOS (+2.3), PHO (+0.5) +1.4
1979: SEA 4, WSB 1 SEA (+1.6), WSB (-0.1) +0.8

2017 NBA Draft Prospect Profiles: Is Josh Jackson a better prospect than Lonzo Ball?

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Josh Jackson, at this point, seems to be the consensus best prospect not named Markelle Fultz or Lonzo Ball.

He’s 6-foot-8. He’s super-athletic. He’s competitive as hell. He’s skilled enough to play the point in a pinch and tough enough that he played the four at Kansas. On paper, he’s Andrew Wiggins physically with all the intangibles that we wish Wiggins had.

Then there’s the other side of it.

Jackson’s jump shot, which went in at a 37.8 percent clip from beyond the arc last season, has enough of a hitch in it that there is legitimate concern about just how good of a shooter he’ll end up being without a complete overhaul of his stroke. There’s also the mental side of the game: Jackson’s an instinctual playmaker that has a bad habit of being a space cadet defensively.

I’m not here to tell you those red flags don’t exist. They do. He has room to grow there.

But I am here to tell you that Josh Jackson is closer to being the best prospect in this draft than the third-best, and by the time I’m done here, you’ll be agreeing with me.

Height: 6’8″
Weight: 207
Wingspan: 6’10”
2016-17 Stats: 16.3 points, 7.4 boards, 3.0 assists, 1.7 steals, 1.1 blocks, 37.8% 3PT

STRENGTHS: The reason that Jackson is so coveted as a prospect are the things that he does that you cannot teach.

It starts with his competitiveness. Jackson is a fiery, he’s intense and it manifests itself in the way that he plays, almost to a fault; Jackson picked up four fouls in 11 of 35 games as a freshman and picked up a handful of technical fouls after interactions with officials. There’s also a toughness to him that outweighs his 207 pound frame. He’s not afraid to get into tangles for loose balls, he’s not going to get backed down easily and he’s more than willing to put his body on the line to take a charge. Simply put: I’d rather try to keep the reins on a player that may care just a little too much than have to find a way to fire up an apathetic talent.

Then there are the physical tools. Athletically, he’s a bouncy, quick-twitch player that can move laterally with terrific body control and the ability to changes speeds on the move. He’s quick enough to stay in front of point guards and explosive enough to block shots, catch lobs and throw down tip-dunks, and his 6-foot-8 size allows him to be a versatile, multi-positional defender. I hesitate on saying he has a elite physical tools due to his wingspan and frame, but we’ll get to that in a minute.

Lastly, there are his instincts. He’s a read-and-react player, a guy that can make plays defensively by jumping passing lanes, getting weak-side blocks and taking charges. He has a knack for getting easy buckets cutting to the rim and is aggressive on the glass on both ends of the floor.

Those are things that cannot be taught. You either have it in you or you don’t, and Jackson has it.

He also has some skills. We’ll get into the issues with his jump shot in a minute, but Jackson did make 37.8 percent of his threes as a freshman, including a 25-for-52 stretch to close the season. He utilizes ball-fakes and has a good enough first step to attack close outs, and while he isn’t the best or most creative finisher at the rim, he is capable of using both hands and has shown that he can make a floater.

Josh Jackson (Photo by Jamie Squire/Getty Images)

What’s more promising, however, is that Jackson has the potential to be a secondary ball-handler and creator. He has above-average vision and is an unselfish player and willing passer, averaging 3.0 assists as a freshman. He can operate in pick-and-rolls and is capable of bringing the ball up against pressure.

He’s still raw offensively — he makes some bad decisions, commits some turnovers — and, at times, looks like he hasn’t been coached all that much defensively, but the skills he does have combined with the things he does that cannot be taught are a fantastic foundation for an NBA organization to work with.

In a sport that is becoming increasingly positionless, Jackson provides starpower potential with versatility on both ends of the floor.

WEAKNESSES: The biggest issue with Jackson as a prospect is his jump shot. Yes, he shot 37.8 percent from beyond the arc, but it’s hard to tell whether or not that’s just the result of Jackson getting hot in a small sample of catch-and-shoot jumpers.

According to Synergy, Jackson shot just 57 percent from the free throw line, 35.9 percent on all jump shots, 32.3 percent on jumpers off the dribble and just 20.8 percent on two-point jumpers. The main concern is that Jackson has a hitch in his release that creates a lot of moving parts in his stroke, resulting in different release points. You can see it in the video below, there is a slingshot action in his release:

The question marks surrounding Jackson’s jumper sink his stock because, despite his height, he doesn’t project as a guy that can play the small-ball four role in the NBA the way that he did at Kansas. Jackson’s 6-foot-10 wingspan is relatively short — for comparison’s sake, Draymond Green has a 7-foot-2 wingspan and Kawhi Leonard has a 7-foot-3 wingspan — and his slender frame makes it hard to project just how much more muscle mass his body can hold.

Put another way, Jackson can guard twos and threes — and potentially ones — at the next level, but he’s not guarding fours. He’s going to be playing a position where he either needs to be an knockdown shooter or capable of creating in isolation in the half court, and Jackson scored just 0.609 points per possession in isolation as a freshman, the 23rd percentile, despite being guarded predominantly by college four-men on a team with three three-point snipers around him.

It begs the question: Is he ever going to be great at anything on the offensive end of the floor?

And that’s before you factor in that he turned 20 years old in February; he’s older than one-and-done freshmen drafted in 2016.

The other issue you’ll hear mentioned with Jackson is that he has bad habits defensively and he gets beaten on the dribble more easily than you would expect from someone with his athleticism. The bad habits — specifically, the tendency to lose focus on who he is guarding — seems to me to be a result of Jackson trying a little too hard to be a playmaker off the ball, and getting beaten off the dribble has a lot to do with his overactive, choppy feet.

Neither are all that concerning to me, particularly when you factor in his intangibles on that end of the floor. Those issues can be coached away, and there’s not better place for that to happen than in the NBA.

NBA COMPARISON: The easy — and lazy — comparison to make is Andrew Wiggins, who is another 6-foot-8, freakishly-athletic small forward to come out of Kansas, and it’s not the worst comparison I’ve ever seen. The two have similar physical tools and question marks about their jump shots. The problem with that comparison, however, is that the things that make Jackson so intriguing are precisely the skills that Wiggins struggles with.

Jackson is a tough, versatile defender and a fiery competitor that is well-rounded offensively: unselfish with promising court vision and a knack for making instinctual, read-and-react plays. His ceiling is as a player that can average more than 20 points, act as a secondary ball-handler and play maker while potentially being a shutdown defender for twos and threes. Andre Igoudala, before he landed with Golden State and turned into a role player in the twilight of his career, had a seven-year stretch where he averaged 12 points, five boards, five assists and 1.5 steals, scoring more than 17 points per game in four of those seasons.

OUTLOOK: The way I see it, Josh Jackson is the the second-best prospect in this draft. I’d draft him over Lonzo Ball, and I think the gap between Markelle Fultz and Josh Jackson is smaller than the gap between Josh Jackson and Ball, who would be third on my draft board.

Jackson has some issues that need fixing — his jump shot, his tendency to be a space cadet defensively — and there are some valid concerns about his age and the fact that his slender frame may not be able to hold all that much more weight, but those issues are coachable. What isn’t coachable, however, is his competitiveness, his intensity, his unselfishness, his instincts and his ability to read the game and be a playmaker, both offensively and defensively.

He’s a gifted athlete that is going to fight — quite possibly in the literal sense — for the team that he’s on. If he puts in the time to develop his jumper, his body and his focus on the defensive side of the ball, I don’t think it’s out of the question that he could average 25 points, five boards and five assists as a shutdown wing defender.

Warriors, Cavaliers meeting in most star-studded NBA Finals ever

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Stephen Curry, LeBron James, Kevin Durant, Kyrie Irving, Draymond Green, Kevin Love, Klay Thompson – the 2017 NBA Finals will be oozing with stars.

Seven All-Stars appearing in the Finals the same year is tied for the most ever with 1983 (76ers: Andrew Toney, Moses Malone, Julius Erving, Maurice Cheeks; Lakers: Magic Johnson, Jamaal Wilkes, Kareem Abdul-Jabbar) and 1962 (Celtics: Bill Russell, Bob Cousy, Sam Jones, Tom Heinsohn; Lakers: Elgin Baylor, Frank Selvy, Jerry West).

But there were 24 All-Stars and 23 teams in 1983 and 24 All-Stars and nine teams in 1962. This year, there were 25 All-Stars and 30 teams – a ratio that makes this year’s feat more impressive.

To account for these differences, I’ve used All-Stars above average – the number of All-Stars in the Finals relative to the number of All-Stars for two average teams that year. For example, the average team had 0.83 All-Stars this year. So, an average matchup of two teams would feature 1.67 All-Stars. The 2017 Finals have seven All-Stars – a difference of 5.33.

Here are the All-Stars above average for every Finals since the NBA instituted an All-Star game:

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Here are breakdowns of the Finals with the most All-Stars above average:

2017: Warriors-Cavaliers

All-Stars: 7

All-Stars per team: 0.83

All-Stars above average: 5.33

Warriors

Stephen Curry

Kevin Durant

Draymond Green

Klay Thompson

Cavaliers

LeBron James

Kyrie Irving

Kevin Love

1983 76ers 4, Lakers 0

All-Stars: 7

All-Stars per team: 1.04

All-Stars above average: 4.91

76ers

Andrew Toney

Moses Malone

Julius Erving

Maurice Cheeks

Lakers

Magic Johnson

Jamaal Wilkes

Kareem Abdul-Jabbar

1987 Lakers 4, Celtics 2

All-Stars: 6

All-Stars per team: 1.09

All-Stars above average: 3.83

Lakers

Magic Johnson

James Worthy

Kareem Abdul-Jabbar

Celtics

Larry Bird

Kevin McHale

Robert Parish

2013 Heat 4, Spurs 3

All-Stars: 5

All-Stars per team: 0.83

All-Stars above average: 3.33

Heat

Chris Bosh

LeBron James

Dwyane Wade

Spurs

Tony Parker

Tim Duncan

2012 Heat 4, Thunder 1

All-Stars: 5

All-Stars per team: 0.83

All-Stars above average: 3.33

Heat

LeBron James

Dwyane Wade

Chris Bosh

Thunder

Russell Westbrook

Kevin Durant

2009 Lakers 4, Magic 1

All-Stars: 5

All-Stars per team: 0.87

All-Stars above average: 3.27

Lakers

Kobe Bryant

Pau Gasol

Magic

Jameer Nelson

Rashard Lewis

Dwight Howard

2010 Lakers 4, Celtics 3

All-Stars: 5

All-Stars per team: 0.93

All-Stars above average: 3.13

Lakers

Kobe Bryant

Pau Gasol

Celtics

Paul Pierce

Rajon Rondo

Kevin Garnett

If you’re wondering about the below-average outliers:

Washington Bullets forward Elvin Hayes was the only All-Star in the Bullets’ 4-3 win over the Seattle SuperSonics in 1978, when there were 23 All-Stars and 22 teams.

There were four All-Stars in the 1965 Finals: Sam Jones, Bill Russell and Tom Heinsohn for the victorious Celtics and Jerry West for the Lakers, who lost in five. Yet, that was still below average in a league with nine teams and 21 All-Stars.

That’s why it’s important to consider the NBA’s changing landscape – which leads to even more appreciation for the caliber of players in this year’s Finals.

Of course, current All-Star status is not the only measure of stardom. The NBA’s best player should count more than the league’s 12th-best player in the lesser conference.

But these Finals would hold up by any measure. They feature winners of the last five MVPs (Curry, Durant, LeBron) and the consensus best player in the world (LeBron).

Cavaliers-Warriors III will truly feature a special collection of talent.

Adrian Wojnarowski: Clippers, not Spurs, ‘pretty overwhelming favorite’ for Chris Paul

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Both the Clippers and Spurs are reportedly taking seriously the idea that Chris Paul could sign with San Antonio this summer.

Is Paul bolting L.A. for the Spurs realistic?

Adrian Wojnarowski of Yahoo Sports on CBS Sports Radio:

Not that I see. I don’t know where that came from, and I’ve spent a lot of time around the Spurs this spring. They would have to just tear up that entire payroll. It’s almost unlike anything the Spurs would have done or would do to. To even have a chance at him, they’d have to really gut the roster. And to do that for a 30-plus-year-old point guard, who has a couple great years left, there’s no question – I think there’s more pressure on the Clippers to have to re-sign him than for the Spurs to turn their whole franchise over to make a run at him. Listen, Chris Paul, financially, the difference with him being able to stay in L.A. and get paid, I’d still have a hard time imaging him leaving there. There’s so much money for him to be made. And in that Los Angeles market, in terms of his marketing endorsements, I still think they’re a pretty overwhelming favorite to re-sign him.

The Clippers can offer Paul a projected $205 million over five years. Because they have his Bird Rights, they don’t need cap space to re-sign him.

The Spurs’ max offer to Paul projects to be $152 million over four years, but they’d need major moves to clear enough cap room to do that. Even if they trim their roster to Kawhi Leonard, LaMarcus Aldridge, Danny Green, Pau Gasol and Tony Parker, they’d still need to dump two of those players.

It’s obviously a lot for San Antonio to overcome.

But it’s not so far outside the Spurs’ norm. To sign LaMarcus Aldridge two years ago, they traded Tiago Splitter (to Hawks) and let Cory Joseph (Raptors), Aron Baynes (Pistons), Marco Belinelli (Kings) walk in free agency.

Paul is probably more valuable than the players San Antonio would have to shed this time around, though his age and the Spurs’ loyalty to Parker raise questions. Would they rather dump an injured and declining Parker or a productive player like Green or Aldridge? (Gasol, who has spent only one year in San Antonio and might even be convinced to opt out, is the most likely to go.)

The Clippers should be favored to sign Paul. But I wouldn’t completely rule out the Spurs.